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Abstract—Social media analytics is increasingly used to
uncover underlying real-world phenomena. The goal of this
paper is to evaluate the role of Twitter in identifying com-
munities of inﬂuence when the “ground truth” is known. We
consider the European Parliament (EP) Twitter users during
a period of eight months, in which they posted over 370,000
tweets. We deﬁne inﬂuence as a retweet relation between
two Twitter users. We construct two networks of inﬂuence:
(i) core, where both users are EP members, and (ii) extended,
where one user can be outside the EP. We detect communities
in both networks and compare them to the “ground truth”:
the political group and country of the EP members. The
results show that the core network closely matches the
political orientation, while the extended network reﬂects the
country of origin. This provides empirical evidence that the
formation of retweet networks and community detection are
appropriate tools to reveal the actual relationships, and can
therefore be used to uncover hidden properties when the
“ground truth” is not known.
Keywords-European Parliament; retweet networks; com-
munity detection; networks of inﬂuence; inﬂuence spreading
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of social media and user-generated contents
on the web is a potentially relevant and rich source of
data. This work is based on data from Twitter1, a social
networking and micro blogging platform with over 300
million monthly active users, posting over 500 million
tweets per day.
There are at least two approaches to analyzing Twitter
data: the (social) network analysis, and the contents anal-
ysis. In our previous research [1] we have combined both
approaches. We have detected inﬂuential communities,
identiﬁed discussion topics and assigned sentiment of the
communities towards selected topics. However, the ques-
tion whether the communities detected have corresponding
real-world counterparts remained unanswered.
In this paper, we study retweet networks of the Members
of the European Parliament and investigate how closely
the community structure of these networks matches the
political group membership and country membership. We
approach these issues by employing a set of analytical
tools. We use tools from the network theory, which have
been applied successfully to characterize a wide variety
of complex systems. We show that network theory is
particularly effective at uncovering structure without prior
knowledge of political orientation.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no
previous work on the analysis of retweet networks of the
Members of the European Parliament. Nevertheless, there
1http://www.twitter.com/
is a considerable body of literature on aspects relevant to
this study.
Twitter data have been used in various contexts en-
compassing identiﬁcation of spreading patterns of popular
information, classes of dynamical collective attention, lin-
guistic usage patterns on worldwide scale, and political
activity.
Conover et al. [2] predict the political alignment of
Twitter users in the run-up to the 2010 US elections
based on content and network structure. They [3] analyze
the polarization of retweet and mention networks for the
same elections. Borondo et al. [4] analyze the user activity
during the 2011 Spanish presidential elections. They [5]
additionally analyze the 2012 Catalan elections focusing
on the interplay between language and the community
structure of the network. Most existing research, as Lars-
son [6] points out, focuses on the online behavior of
political ﬁgures during election campaigns.
Hix et al. [7] investigate the voting cohesion of political
groups in the European Parliament. Larsson [6] examines
the Twitter presence of representatives outside of the
election periods.
Recent research has adopted a networks science-based
approach to investigate the structure of legislative work in
the US Congress, including committee and subcommittee
membership [8], bill cosponsoring [9], and roll-call votes
[10]. In a more recent work, Dal Maso et al. [11] examine
the community structure with respect to political coalitions
and government structure in the Italian Parliament.
There are three different ways how users on Twitter
interact: 1) a user follows posts of other users, 2) a user can
respond to other user’s tweets by mentioning them, and 3)
a user can forward interesting tweets by retweeting them.
Based on these three interaction types, one can deﬁne
three measures of inﬂuence exerted by a user on Twitter:
indegree inﬂuence (the number of followers, indicating the
size of his audience), mention inﬂuence (the number of
mentions of the user, indicating his ability to engage others
in conversation), and retweet inﬂuence (the number of
retweets, indicating the ability of the user to write content
of interest to be forwarded to others).
Kwak et al. [12] compare three different network-
based measures of inﬂuence on Twitter: the number of
followers, page-rank, and the number of retweets—ﬁnding
the ranking of the most inﬂuential users differed depending
on the measure. Cha et al. [13] also compare three
different measures of inﬂuence: the number of followers,
the number of retweets, and the number of mentions—also
ﬁnding that the most followed users did not necessarily
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Table I
THE NUMBER OF TWITTER USERS BY POLITICAL GROUP.
EP Twitter Core Extended
Group seats accounts network network
GUE-NGL 52 36 34 35
S&D 191 151 126 136
Greens-EFA 50 45 43 45
ALDE 68 50 42 47
EPP 218 152 118 136
ECR 72 49 37 44
EFDD 47 35 26 31
NA 52 28 23 27
Total 750 546 449 501
score highest on the other measures. Wang et al. [14]
compare the number of followers and page-rank with a
modiﬁed page-rank measure that accounts for topic, again
ﬁnding that ranking depends on the inﬂuence measure. Suh
et al. [15] investigate how different factors such as account
age, use of hashtags and URLs impact the inﬂuence of
the user measured by the number of retweets. Bakshy et
al. [16] investigate how information spreads on a retweet
network and whether there are preconditions for a user to
become inﬂuential.
Along with the small-world phenomenon and power-
law degree distribution, the most salient property real-
world networks exhibit is community structure, where
network nodes are partitioned together in tightly knit
groups, between which there are only loose connections
[17]. The identiﬁcation of the community structure of a
network is commonly based on the optimization of its
modularity [18]. Many different algorithms exist which
employ various approaches [19]. In this work, we per-
form community detection based on the Louvain method,
introduced by [20], which is among the algorithms known
to perform well in a variety of domains [21].
The methodology for evaluating the degree to which
the detected communities match known groups [22] used
in this work is based on the B3 algorithm [23]. The
B3 measure is the best measure according to the formal
constraints for extrinsic clustering evaluation measures
proposed by Amigo´ et al. [24].
The existing research suggests that retweets are the
most suitable measure of inﬂuence on Twitter. Community
detection in the retweet networks reveals the communities
formed based on the spreading of inﬂuence on Twitter.
Our goal is to identify the main factors along which these
communities of inﬂuence are formed.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the EU Parliament and the Twitter data collected. In
section III we outline the Louvain community detection
method, and the measures to evaluate the detected com-
munities w.r.t. the actual groups. Sections IV and V present
the results. We construct two retweet networks from the
EU Parliament data, and compare them to political groups
and countries of origin of the Parliament members. In
section VI we discuss the results and plans for future
research.
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Figure 1. Daily volume of tweets posted by the EP members.
II. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON TWITTER
The European Union (EU) is a political and economic
union which currently consists of 28 member states located
in Europe. The EU operates through a system of suprana-
tional institutions which cover legislative, executive, judi-
ciary, and monetary branches. The European Parliament,
together with the Council of the European Union, is the
principal legislative body.
A. The European Parliament
The European Parliament (EP) functions analogously to
national parliaments in traditional parliamentary democra-
cies. It is elected every ﬁve years directly by the citizens
of the EU. Member states are allocated a number of
seats which roughly reﬂects the state’s population. The
EP members are elected on a national basis, but sit in the
EP according to political groups they belong to.
Our work focuses on the period between October 1,
2014 and May 31, 2015. This period falls within the 8th
EP which was elected on July 1, 2014. During this period,
the EP consisted of 8 political groups:
1) European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE-
NGL)—socialists and communists group,
2) Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
(S&D)—social-democrats group,
3) The Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens-
EFA)—greens and regionalists group,
4) Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
(ALDE)—liberals group,
5) European People’s Party (EPP)—christian-
democrats group,
6) European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)—
conservatives group,
7) Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
(EFDD)—euroskeptics group, and
8) the Non-Attached Members (NA)—independents.
B. Collection of tweets
We acquired the list of the EP members form the ofﬁcial
site of the EP2. The list consists of 750 EP members. Their
2http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/full-list.html (accessed June
1, 2015)
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(a) The core network (b) The extended network
Figure 2. The core network colored by the actual political groups and the extended network colored by the detected communities.
distribution according to political groups is presented in
Table I (column EP seats). The ofﬁcial Twitter account of
the EP, Europarl EN, provides a list of Twitter accounts
of the EP members3. We matched the EP members to
the Twitter accounts and excluded Twitter accounts of
former EP members; the result is a manually veriﬁed list
of 546 Twitter accounts of all EP members which own one.
The distribution of the EP members with Twitter accounts
according to political groups is given in Table I (column
Twitter accounts).
Through the Twitter Streaming API4, we have moni-
tored the activity related to the ofﬁcial accounts of the
EP members; for each member we have collected all their
tweets as well as all replies to and retweets of any tweet
posted by them.
Within the period of our analysis—between October 1,
2014 and May 31, 2015—the EP members have posted
370,561 tweets, of which 195,797 (53%) are originally
authored and the rest 174,764 (47%) are retweets. On
average, all EP members together posted 1525 tweets per
day, and each active member posted on average 3.1 tweets
per day (Figure 1).
C. Construction of retweet networks
The collected tweets described in the previous section
are used to construct retweet networks. A retweet net-
work is a directed weighted graph, where nodes represent
Twitter users and edges represent the retweet relation.
The direction of an edge corresponds to the direction
of information spreading or inﬂuence; the weight of the
edge is the number of times one user retweets the other.
3https://twitter.com/Europarl EN/lists/all-meps-on-twitter/members
(accessed September 30, 2014)
4https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview/request-parameters#
follow
Table II
SIZE OF THE TWO RETWEET NETWORKS.
Core Extended
network network
Nodes 449 378,313
Edges 3,399 587,381
Detected
communities 9 17
We construct two retweet networks: (i) the core network,
containing as nodes only the EP members and (ii) the
extended network, containing as nodes the EP members
and all other users which have retweeted or have been
retweeted by an EP member.
The core network consists of 449 nodes and 3,399
edges. The distribution of nodes according to political
groups is in Table I (column Core network). The extended
network consists of 378,313 nodes, of which 501 are the
EP members, and 587,381 edges. The distribution of the
member nodes according to political groups is also in
Table I (column Extended network). Note that there are
more EP members in the extended network (501) than
in the core network (449) since the 52 EP members (the
difference) were retweeted only by the non-EP members.
An overview of the size of both networks is given in
Table II.
III. COMMUNITY DETECTION AND EVALUATION
MEASURES
The core network consists of the EP members and the
retweet relations between them. Since retweeting can be
interpreted as expressing agreement on the posted tweet, it
is reasonable to expect that members of the same political
group will be bundled together within the network. In
Figure 2a, we present the core network with a force-
directed layout, where the color of the node identiﬁes the
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Figure 3. Distribution of political groups across the 9 communities
in the core network. The shades of the basic color indicate different
communities within a political group.
political group of the EP member. There is an intuitive
visual grouping of the EP members according to political
groups. In Figure 2b, extended network with the detected
communities is presented.
The goal of most community detection algorithms,
implicit or explicit, is to ﬁnd the best trade-off between a
large intra-cluster density and a small inter-cluster density.
Community detection algorithms perform maximization
of modularity [25]. A good partitioning of a network
in communities is one in which there are fewer than
expected edges between communities. The modularity is,
up to a multiplicative constant, the number of edges falling
within groups minus the expected number in an equivalent
network with edges placed at random. Previous work on
roll-call votes suggests that the result of modularity opti-
mization should ﬁnd groups and coalitions in a parliament
[11].
We perform community detection using the well estab-
lished Louvain algorithm [20]. The Louvain method is a
computationally very efﬁcient algorithm that is well suited
for large networks. It optimizes modularity through an
iterative heuristic approach that consists of two repeating
phases. In the ﬁrst phase, modularity is optimized by
allowing only local changes in communities; in the second,
a new network is build that consists of one node for
each previously found community. The algorithm repeats
the iterations until the ﬁrst phase can make no further
improvements in modularity.
To asses how closely the detected communities match
the political groups, we use the B3 measure [23], which
is considered as the most preferred measure for extrinsic
evaluating of clusterings [24]. The B3 measure decom-
poses the evaluation into calculating the precision and
recall associated with each node in the network. Let N
be the set of all nodes in the network. For each node
n ∈ N , we denote as L(n) the set of nodes which have
the same label as n, in this case, members of the same
political group. With C(n), we denote the set of all nodes
which are members of the same community as n. The B3
precision of a node n, P (n), is computed as the fraction
of nodes which have the same label and are in the same
community as n, from all the nodes which are in the same
community as n. Similarly, the recall of a node n, R(n),
is computed as the fraction of nodes with the same label
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
20
40
60
80
100
Figure 4. Composition of the 9 communities by political groups in the
core network. Different colors indicate the 8 political groups in the EP.
and in the same community from all nodes with the same
label as n.
P (n) =
|L(n) ∩ C(n)|
|C(n)| (1)
R(n) =
|L(n) ∩ C(n)|
|L(n)| (2)
The precision and recall can be further combined into
an F1 score:
F1(n) = 2 · P (n) ·R(n)
P (n) +R(n)
(3)
The F1 score is a special case of Van Rijsbergen’s
effectiveness measure [26], where precision and recall can
be given different weights.
The precision reﬂects the homogeneity of a community.
The more members from the same political group in the
community, the higher the precision. Conversely, the recall
reﬂects how spread-out across communities a political
group is. The more members of a political group in the
same community, the higher the recall. The F1 score
balances the precision and recall.
Furthermore, to quantify how well a political group
is reﬂected in the community structure of the network,
we calculate the mean precision, recall, and F1 of the
EP members of each group. Let {L1, L2, . . . , Lk} be the
partitioning of the nodes according to actual labels. The
precision, recall, and F1 score of the set of the nodes Li
are computed as:
P (Li) =
1
|Li|
∑
n∈Li
P (n) (4)
R(Li) =
1
|Li|
∑
n∈Li
R(n) (5)
F1(Li) =
1
|Li|
∑
n∈Li
F1(n) (6)
IV. RESULTS: THE CORE NETWORK
Community detection in the core network results in a
partitioning into 9 communities. We look at how close
the partitioning in communities matches the partitioning in
political groups. Figure 3 shows how members of different
groups are spread out across communities. Generally, most
of the members of one group are located in a single
community. The EP members from S&D, however, are
35353
Table III
THE CORE NETWORK: A COMPARISON OF THE DETECTED AND
RANDOM COMMUNITIES WITH POLITICAL GROUPS.
Communities Precision Recall F1
detected 0.785 0.658 0.684
random 0.199 0.127 0.141
ratio 3.9 5.2 4.9
divided into two communities; the members from EPP,
even though mostly contained in a single community,
participate in 8 of the 9 communities. Figure 4 shows
the composition of communities with respect to political
groups. In general, the communities consist mostly of
members of a single group. Notable exceptions are com-
munity no. 4 which contains many EP members from both
ECR and EFDD, and community no. 7 which contains EP
members from ﬁve different groups.
We calculate the mean precision, recall, and F1 score
for the network to characterize how well the community
structure reﬂects the political group membership of the
EP members. The results are in Table III. The precision is
moderately high, 0.785, which reﬂects the fact that most of
the communities, with the exception of the fourth and sev-
enth community, are dominated by a single political group.
The recall is above average, 0.658, which reﬂects the fact
that most of the political groups, with the exception of
S&D and EPP, are predominantly contained in a single
community. The F1 score is also above average, 0.684.
In comparison, a random partitioning of the graph into 9
partitions has (on average over 1000 random partitionings)
precision of 0.199, which is almost 4 times lower, recall of
0.127, which is over 5 times lower, and F1 score of 0.141,
which is nearly 5 times lower than the scores obtained with
the partitioning into communities.
The overlap measures for each group are shown in
Table IV. GUE-NGL has an average precision (0.471) and
recall (0.574), which corresponds to its members being
dispersed in several groups where they are not a majority.
S&D has a very high precision (0.902) and average recall
(0.462), as a result of being almost perfectly split into
two communities where its members are an overwhelming
majority. Greens-EFA has a moderately high precision
(0.783) and a very high recall (0.910) because its members
are mostly contained in a single community where they
are a majority. ALDE has the highest precision (0.913)
and recall (1.000) due to the fact that all its members
are contained in a single community which contains
only a few other members. EPP has a high precision
(0.864) and above average recall (0.637), reﬂecting the
fact that it members are predominantly contained in one
large community and one small community, in both of
which they constitute a majority. ECR has above average
precision (0.603) and high recall (0.848) as a consequence
of it being contained predominantly in a single community
which contains also quite a few members of other groups.
EFDD has the lowest precision (0.252) and an average
recall (0.479) resulting from the fact that it is spread out
across several communities, in none of which its members
Table IV
THE CORE NETWORK: OVERLAP MEASURES BETWEEN THE GROUPS
AND THE 9 COMMUNITIES.
Group Precision Recall F1
GUE-NGL 0.471 0.574 0.518
S&D 0.902 0.462 0.611
Greens-EFA 0.783 0.910 0.842
ALDE 0.913 1.000 0.955
EPP 0.864 0.637 0.733
ECR 0.603 0.848 0.705
EFDD 0.252 0.479 0.330
NA 0.872 0.762 0.813
micro avg. 0.785 0.658 0.684
Table V
THE EXTENDED NETWORK: A COMPARISON OF THE DETECTED AND
RANDOM COMMUNITIES PER POLITICAL GROUPS AND COUNTRIES.
Communities Precision Recall F1
detected 0.389 0.223 0.249
Groups random 0.209 0.074 0.100
ratio 1.9 3.0 2.5
detected 0.574 0.620 0.501
Countries random 0.105 0.112 0.089
ratio 5.5 5.5 5.6
are a majority. And ﬁnally, NA has high precision (0.872)
and moderately high recall (0.762) corresponding to the
largest part of its members being in a single community
which contains no members from other political groups.
V. RESULTS: THE EXTENDED NETWORK
The extended network consists of the EP members as
well as all other users which have retweeted or have been
retweeted by them. As such, it is several orders of mag-
nitude larger than the core network. Moreover, the edges
from non-EP members to the members far outnumber the
edges between the members. This network reﬂects the
retweeting practice of the general public when it comes
to political issues. In this case, we want to investigate
two alternatives: Is the partitioning of the network in
communities dominated by the political groups, or by the
countries of origin of the EP members?
We again apply the Louvain method for community
detection which results in 17 communities. A force-
directed layout of the network, colored by the detected
communities is in Figure 2b. For further analysis, we focus
only on the EP members—for them, we know the “ground
truth”, i.e., the political group and country which they
represent.
A. Communities and political groups
Analogously to the core network, we analyze how close
the partitioning in communities matches the partitioning in
political groups. Figure 5 shows how members of different
groups are spread out across communities. Generally, the
EP members from all of the groups are spread out across
most of the communities. Figure 5 indicates that the
community structure of the extended network does not
reﬂect the political orientation of the retweeters of the EP
members.
The mean precision, recall, and F1 score for the ex-
tended network, which characterize how well the commu-
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Figure 5. Distribution of political groups across the 17 communities in
the extended network. The shades of the basic color indicate the distribu-
tion of an individual political group between the detected communities.
Table VI
THE EXTENDED NETWORK: OVERLAP MEASURES BETWEEN THE
GROUPS AND THE 17 COMMUNITIES.
Group Precision Recall F1
GUE-NGL 0.364 0.144 0.184
S&D 0.450 0.168 0.234
Greens-EFA 0.191 0.226 0.175
ALDE 0.351 0.339 0.326
EPP 0.452 0.167 0.219
ECR 0.227 0.240 0.228
EFDD 0.566 0.505 0.511
NA 0.250 0.317 0.276
micro avg. 0.389 0.223 0.249
nity structure reﬂects the political group membership, are
presented in Table V (rows Groups). Both precision and
recall (and subsequently F1) are low. In comparison, a
random partitioning of the graph into 17 partitions has (on
average over 1000 random partitionings) precision which
is almost 2 times lower, recall which is 3 times lower, and
F1 score which is 2.5 times lower than the ones obtained
with the partitioning into communities. These ratios are
still substantially lower than those for the core network.
In Table VI, we present the mean precision, recall,
and F1 score for each political group. All groups are
characterized by low scores, except EFDD whose scores
are even higher than those for the core network. Even
though the retweet behavior of its members does not
facilitate the community detection algorithm to group them
together, the retweet behavior of their Twitter audience
allows the algorithm to do a better job of grouping them
together.
B. Communities and countries
We next investigate how the country of origin of the
EP members is reﬂected in the community structure. To
this end, we evaluate the matching of the partitioning in
communities with respect to the partitioning in countries.
Figure 6 illustrates how members from different countries
within the EU are spread out across communities. Many
countries have their members contained within only a few
communities. Moreover, in the majority of countries, one
community contains the prevailing number of members.
The evaluation measures for the partitioning in countries
are presented in Table V (rows Countries). In comparison
to the partitioning in political groups, they are substantially
higher. We also evaluated the average random partitioning,
Table VII
THE EXTENDED NETWORK: OVERLAP MEASURES BETWEEN THE
COUNTRIES AND THE 17 COMMUNITIES.
Country Precision Recall F1
Austria 0.124 1.000 0.220
Belgium 0.127 0.459 0.198
Bulgaria 0.028 0.333 0.050
Croatia 0.049 0.406 0.088
Cyprus 0.208 0.625 0.313
Czech Republic 0.037 0.167 0.058
Denmark 0.297 0.802 0.433
Estonia 0.021 0.500 0.041
Finland 0.821 0.686 0.741
France 0.852 0.415 0.553
Germany 0.460 0.893 0.607
Greece 0.750 1.000 0.857
Hungary 0.034 0.680 0.065
Ireland 0.833 1.000 0.909
Italy 0.884 0.605 0.685
Latvia 0.140 1.000 0.245
Lithuania 0.037 0.556 0.070
Luxembourg 0.019 0.556 0.037
Malta 0.042 0.500 0.076
Netherlands 0.370 0.837 0.513
Poland 0.676 0.938 0.785
Portugal 0.052 0.440 0.092
Romania 0.061 0.420 0.104
Slovakia 0.029 0.278 0.051
Slovenia 0.067 1.000 0.125
Spain 0.913 0.319 0.450
Sweden 0.444 0.680 0.534
United Kingdom 0.769 0.517 0.591
micro avg. 0.574 0.620 0.501
Table VIII
A SUMMARY OF THE F1 SCORES.
Communities Groups (8) Countries (28)
Core detected (9) 0.684 /
network random (9) 0.141 /
Extended detected (17) 0.249 0.501
network random (17) 0.100 0.089
which has precision, recall, and F1 score that are around
5.5 times lower than the ones obtained with the partition-
ing into communities. These ratios are comparable with
those for the partitioning in political groups of the core
network.
Table VII shows the mean precision, recall, and F1 score
for each country represented in the EP. The F1 scores
for the different countries vary substantially, ranging from
0.037 for Luxembourg to 0.909 for Ireland. The complete
matrix of overlaps between the countries and communities
is in Figure 7. A summary of the F1 scores for the core and
extended network, in comparison to the political groups
and countries, for the detected and random communities,
is in Table VIII.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigate the retweeting behavior of
the EP members in a period of eight months. We have
used the Twitter data to identify communities of inﬂuence
and evaluated the detected communities with respect to
the known “ground truth”. The analysis reproduces the
actual political groups and countries of origin of the EP
members, without prior assumptions.
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Figure 6. Distribution of countries across the 17 communities in the
extended network. Different colors correspond to the detected commu-
nities.
We have already successfully applied the Louvain
method for community detection to uncover inﬂuential
communities in the retweet networks, albeit in the context
of climate and energy issues [1]. The results of the present
study reinforce the suitability of the Louvain method for
uncovering communities in the retweet networks. On the
same data, we have also performed preliminary commu-
nity detection by hierarchical stochastic block modeling
[27]. The ﬁrst experiment resulted in 12 communities
for the core network, with a noticeably lower F1 score
(0.601). The extended network was partitioned into 77
communities, also with substantially lower F1 scores:
0.156 in comparison to the political groups, and 0.270
in comparison to the countries.
Comparison of different community detection algo-
rithms is interesting, but we plan to focus our future
research in the following three key areas.
The presence and activities of the EP members on
Twitter can be coupled with their actions in the Parliament.
We plan to investigate the relations between the retweet
networks and the roll-call vote networks. One of the
ﬁndings of this study is that community detection can
recreate the structure of different political groups with dif-
ferent degrees of effectiveness. Different political groups,
also, manifest different levels of coherency in their voting
behavior. Investigating whether these two phenomena are
related will contribute to the overarching theme of the
social media engagement by elected representatives.
So far, we have disregarded the contents of the tweets
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Austria 13
Belgium 1 9 2 2
Bulgaria 3 1 1 1
Croatia 3 4 1
Cyprus 1 3
Czech Republic 1 3 2 2 1 1 2
Denmark 1 8
Estonia 1 1
Finland 1 1 9
France 31 22 7
Germany 51 1 1 1
Greece 9
Hungary 4 1
Ireland 10
Italy 15 1 45
Latvia 6
Lithuania 1 2
Luxembourg 2 1
Malta 3 3
Netherlands 1 1 21
Poland 1 30
Portugal 3 1 1
Romania 2 8 1 1 1
Slovakia 2 2 1 1
Slovenia 7
Spain 5 1 20 6 10
Sweden 2 1 13
United Kingdom 20 39 1 1
Figure 7. The overlaps of countries and communities. The body of
the table consists of the numbers of the EP members from different
countries, belonging to the detected communities, with the majority of a
community highlighted.
posted, and focused on the aggregated retweet behav-
ior. The spreading of inﬂuence on Twitter is, however,
dependant on the discussion topics. Different topics are
accompanied by different levels of agreement and contro-
versy, and may bring two political groups closer together
or move them further apart. We plan to implement topic
detection on Twitter data, and investigate how different
topics inﬂuence the community structure of the retweet
network of the EP members.
Different topics convey different sentiment. Sentiment
analysis can be applied to uncover the attitude of different
communities toward various issues. We have already ap-
plied the sentiment analysis to various domains, such as:
(i) to compare the sentiment leaning of different network
communities towards various environmental topics [1], (ii)
to study the emotional dynamics of Facebook comments
on conspiracy theories [28], (iii) to analyze the effects
of Twitter sentiment on stock prices [29], (iv) to monitor
the sentiment about political parties before and after the
elections [30], and (v) to rank the widely used emojis by
sentiment [31]. In the future we plan to employ sentiment
analysis to characterize the sentiment of the EP political
groups towards different policy and regulation issues.
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